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 Closing the Floodgates: The Battle Over Workers’ 
Compensation Rights in California 
Gabe Feldman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The concussion lawsuits facing the National Football League 
(NFL) have been heralded as the “tobacco litigation” of the NFL and 
garnered panicked reports of the demise of our modern-day national 
pastime.  Merits of the case aside, the sheer number of plaintiffs suing 
the league is staggering.  As of November 1, 2012, 3,798 former play-
ers—encompassing 170 lawsuits—had filed concussion-related law-
suits against the NFL.1  In other words, more than 30% of all living 
retired NFL players are suing the NFL for injuries related to concus-
sions and head trauma.  The lawsuits allege that the NFL failed to take 
reasonable steps to protect players from the risks2—including neuro-
cognitive decline, permanent mental disability, and death—created by 
concussive and sub-concussive head injuries suffered while playing in 
NFL games.  The plaintiffs also allege that the NFL not only breached 
its duty to prevent harm to its players, but also “orchestrated a cam-
paign of disinformation designed to convince [p]layers . . . that concus-
sive and sub-concussive blows posed no real danger.”3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Associate Professor, Tulane Law School; Director, Tulane Sports Law Program; Associate 
Provost for NCAA Compliance, Tulane University. 
 1 See Paul D. Anderson, Plaintiffs/Former Players, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION (Nov. 1, 
2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?page_id=274. 
 2 See Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, ¶¶ 72-74, 133, 
238, In re National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 2:12-md-02323-
AB (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2012), MDL No. 2323 [hereinafter Long-Form Complaint]. The Master 
Complaint further alleges that “players who sustain repeated concussive and sub-concussive 
impacts are at great risk of developing chronic traumatic encephalopathy and other serious 
neurological disorders. . . [and] [t]hose disorders, which remain latent for years, can culminate in 
severe disability and death.”  See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants Na-
tional Football League’s And NFL Properties LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master 
Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 4, In re National Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litigation, No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2012), MDL No. 2323 [hereinafter 
Memorandum in Opposition]. 
 3 Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 2, at 6.  The players allege that the NFL formed 
the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) Committee in 1994 to:  
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While the massive multi-district concussion litigation has stolen 
the headlines as the case winds its way through the courts,4 former 
players and teams are (relatively quietly) battling over the players’ 
ability to collect workers’ compensation benefits for similar injuries.  
In particular, the players and owners are fighting over the players’ 
access to California’s flexible workers’ compensation regime despite 
the fact that many of these players are long-retired and/or did not play 
for one of the NFL’s California-based teams.       
The workers’ compensation floodgates opened with a wave of 
claims brought in California5 by former NFL players who suffered a 
variety of orthopedic injuries.  More than 700 former players brought 
such claims with the typical lump-sum settlement amounting to be-
tween $100,000 and $200,000.6 Notably, most of these players would 
have been ineligible to file for workers’ compensation claims in any 
other state.7  The second wave, however, has featured claims by players 
who suffered head trauma while playing in the NFL.  Typically, these 
claims have settled in the six figure range, including an agreed-upon 
indemnity and obligation to cover future medical care.8 
                                                                                                                           
create a façade of scientific research that the NFL could invoke to conceal the fact that the 
game it oversaw—and from which it reaped billions of dollars—was slowly ruining the lives 
of many players.  To accomplish that deceit, the MTBI Committee performed several stud-
ies, purporting to find no link between football-related head trauma and long-term brain 
damage. 
Id. at 7. The Master Complaint also claims that the MTBI Committee’s findings were “a sham” 
and that Dr. Elliot Pellman, the head of the committee, “was unqualified and served as a mere 
mouthpiece for the NFL’s political agenda.”  Id.; see also id. (alleging that the MTBI Committee 
“conducted severely flawed studies, fired scientists who dissented from its faulty conclusions, and 
actively disputed other studies that revealed  the truth”). 
 4 The NFL has moved to dismiss the entirety of the Master Complaint on the grounds that 
all of the claims are preempted by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement under § 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).  See generally 
Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League and NFL Properties LLC in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint on 
Preemption Grounds, In re National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012).  The parties are scheduled to finish briefing the 
preemption issue by the end of 2012 and the court will consider the preemption argument as a 
threshold issue separate and apart (and before) considering the NFL’s other arguments on its 
motion to dismiss.  
 5 These cases do not present any meaningful financial cost to California because most of 
the claims are paid by the teams or their insurance carriers or a state fund that is underwritten 
by businesses already paying for workers’ compensation insurance.  Alan Schwarz, Case Will Test 
N.F.L. Teams’ Liability in Dementia , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/sports/football/06worker.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Presentation by Jason Hillman, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Cavaliers Operating 
Co., in Las Vegas, Nev. at the Am. Bar Ass’n Forum on the Sports and Entm’t Indus. Conference 
(Oct. 4-6, 2012). 
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Given the over 4,000 plaintiffs who have sued the NFL for con-
cussion-related claims,9 there are likely hundreds of players who may 
be able to seek workers’ compensation claims in California for head 
trauma.  Although the possible exposure from these claims is specula-
tive, the risk is significant and could cost NFL teams and their insurers 
in excess of $100 million.10  At a minimum, the annual impact on teams 
is no longer a blip on the balance sheet.  Insurance premiums for Cali-
fornia are rising at a rapid clip, and it is not unheard of for an NFL 
team to be paying in excess of $1 million per year in premiums in Cali-
fornia alone.11  These claims also have the potential to impact non-
sport team employers—anyone who has employees working or even 
attending conferences in California—and could force some employers 
to limit or eliminate their employees’ work in California.12  
The NFL and its teams are trying to shut the door on this “Gold 
Rush” by contracting around California law in the standard player 
contract with choice of law or choice of forum provisions and by util-
izing California’s “reciprocity measure” to limit the players’ claims to 
the home state of their former NFL teams.  Each of these argu-
ments—and the reason for the workers’ compensation “Gold Rush” in 
California—will be discussed in this short essay. 
CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGIME OPENED THE 
FLOODGATES FOR CLAIMS FROM RETIRED NFL PLAYERS 
Workers’ compensation laws provide protections and benefits for 
employees who are injured in the course of their employment.  In the 
typical case, the workers’ compensation regime grants tort immunity 
to employers in exchange for the regime’s protections and benefits to 
the employee.  Although some states have specifically excluded pro-
fessional athletes from workers’ compensation coverage,13 most states’ 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Anderson, supra note 1. 
 10 Hillman, supra note 8. 
 11 Id. 
 12 In fact, the Arena Football League has chosen not to field a team in California to avoid 
the exposure to the state’s workers’ compensation regime.  Schwarz, supra note 5. 
 13 See FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (2012) (excluding “[p]rofessional athletes, such as professional 
boxers, wrestlers, baseball, football, basketball, hockey, polo, tennis, jai alai, and similar players”); 
77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 565 (2012); TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.095 (2005) (“A professional athlete 
employed under a contract for hire or a collective bargaining agreement who is entitled to bene-
fits for medical care and weekly benefits that are equal to or greater than the benefits provided 
under this subtitle may not receive benefits under this subtitle and the equivalent benefits under 
the contract or collective bargaining agreement.  An athlete covered by such a contract or 
agreement who sustains an injury in the course and scope of the athlete’s employment shall elect 
to receive either the benefits available under this subtitle or the benefits under the contract or 
agreement.”). 
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regimes treat professional athletes and their teams like any other em-
ployee-employer relationship.14 
California’s workers’ compensation laws have invited a flood of 
claims from former NFL players15 because of a multitude of player-
friendly components of California law.  
First, California is virtually alone among the states home to NFL 
teams that recognizes “cumulative injury” as a basis for recovery of 
workers’ compensation.16  As opposed to a “specific” injury, which is 
caused by one incident or exposure, “cumulative” injury can be the 
result of “repetitive mentally or physically traumatic activities extend-
ing over a period of time, the combined effect of which causes any 
disability or need for medical treatment.”17  Retired NFL players have 
thus been able to receive compensation for head, neck, and neurologi-
cal injuries. 
Second, California has an employee-friendly statute of limitations 
that is tolled until the employer formally notifies the employee of his 
rights under California’s workers’ compensation system.18  NFL teams, 
either believing that they had adequately taken care of their players’ 
medical conditions at the time, or hoping to avoid workers’ compensa-
tion claims, or simply being unaware of the possibility of such claims, 
historically had not informed their players of their rights under Cali-
                                                                                                                           
 14 In a case involving a former major league baseball player, the player argued that work-
ers’ compensation does not apply to “high price athletes.”  The court rejected the argument, 
holding that workers’ compensation applies to “all employees regardless of their earnings.  If 
professional athletes were excluded from coverage, then hundreds and possibly thousands of low 
as well as high priced athletes on Major and Minor League Teams would be deprived of the 
humanitarian benefits and protection the Act affords.”  Bayless v. Philadelphia Nat’l League 
Club, 472 F. Supp. 625, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 15 Former players in other professional sports leagues, including the National Basketball 
Association, have brought claims in California, but this brief essay will focus on the NFL-related 
claims and litigation. 
 16 See Cal. Lab. Code § 3208.1 (2010); see also Bobbie N. Roquemore, Creating a Level 
Playing Field: The Case for Bringing Workers’ Compensation for Professional Athletes into a 
Single Federal System by Extending the Longshore Act, 57 LOY. L. REV. 793, 826-28 (2011). 
 17 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.1 (2010). 
 18 See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3550 (2012) (requiring employers to post in a conspicuous 
place the name of their insurance carrier and the entity responsible for workers compensation 
claims); see, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 702 P.2d 197, 201 (1985) 
(“[W]hen an employer fails to perform its statutory duty to notify an injured employee of his 
workers' compensation rights, the injured employee is unaware of those rights from the date of 
injury through the date of the employer's breach, then the statute of limitations will be tolled 
until the employee receives actual knowledge that he may be entitled to benefits under the 
workers’ compensation system.”).  In contrast, most states have a one to five year statute of 
limitations on workers’ compensation claims.  See Schwarz, supra note 5. 
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fornia’s regime. This, in turn, tolled the statute and allowed NFL play-
ers from as early as the 1960’s and 1970’s to bring claims.19 
Third, California’s system has a broad reach that covers employ-
ees of non-California employers who are injured while in California 
temporarily on behalf of their employers.  Under Section 3600.5 of the 
California Labor Code, workers’ compensation benefits in California 
are afforded to any employee who has been “hired or is regularly em-
ployed in the state and receives personal injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of such employment outside of th[e] state.”20 
The California Workers’ Compensation Board has taken a wide 
view of the phrase “regularly employed” that has allowed NFL players 
to be covered under the broad umbrella of workers’ compensation 
rights in the state.  For example, in Injured Workers’ Insurance Fund of 
Maryland v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Crosby), a re-
tired Baltimore Colts player was deemed to be regularly employed in 
California—and thus entitled to worker’s compensation benefits in 
the state—despite the fact that he had only played a single game in 
California.21  Similarly, in Carroll v. Saints, a retired player for the Cin-
cinnati Bengals and New Orleans Saints was found to be “regularly 
employed” in California despite the fact that he had only played two 
games in California during his four-year NFL career.22  Neither of 
these players were residents nor had they signed their employment 
contracts in California.23  Yet, in each case, this sporadic and infrequent 
time spent in California was deemed regular employment sufficient to 
entitle these NFL players to workers’ compensation benefits in Cali-
fornia.  
Leroy Thompson’s case serves as a good illustration.  Thompson, 
a back-up running back, played in the NFL from 1991-1996 for the 
Pittsburgh Steelers, New England Patriots, Kansas City Chiefs, and 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers.24  He qualified for workers’ compensation 
benefits in California because four of his eighty games were played in 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Schwarz, supra note 5.  For example, Lance Alworth, a wide receiver for the San Diego 
Chargers who retired in 1972 and is more than 70 years old, was able to bring a claim for work-
ers’ compensation benefits in 2010.  Id. 
 20 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600.5 (2012). 
 21 See Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund of Md. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 29 Cal. Workers’ 
Comp. Rep. 182 (2001).  Similarly, in Rocor Transportation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Board, the Board held that a long haul truck driver who spent less than ten percent of his em-
ployment in California was “regularly employed” within California and thus entitled to workers’ 
compensation benefits in the state.  66 Cal. Cogeneration Council 1136 (2001). 
 22 Carroll v. New Orleans Saints, No. ADJ2295331 (ANA0397551) (Workers' Comp. Ap-
peals Bd. Jan. 24, 2011). The Bengals, however, argued that he should be denied benefits because 
of Section 3600.5(b). See id. at 11. 
 23 Id. at 12. 
 24 Schwarz, supra note 5.   
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the state.  His workers’ compensation claim was filed in 2008 and al-
leged cumulative injuries to his “head, neck, back, spine, shoulder, 
hips, elbows, wrists, hands, legs, knees, ankles, [and] feet.”25  He re-
ceived a settlement of $120,000.26 
Attempts to limit the statutory availability of workers’ compensa-
tion benefits to professional athletes in California have failed.  In 
1997, legislation—sponsored by NFL owners—was introduced that 
would have limited California worker’s compensation benefits to ath-
letes who lived in the state and would have prevented athletes from 
collecting benefits for cumulative injuries.  This legislation, along with 
a bill that would have completely eliminated workers’ compensation 
benefits for any professional athlete making more than $226,000 a 
year, failed.27 
As a result of California’s unique workers’ compensation regime, 
most major professional sports teams have faced claims in California 
filed by former players.28  This essay will focus on two approaches 
taken by NFL teams for limiting the workers’ compensation rush to 
California—contracting around California through choice of law and 
choice of forum clauses and a statutory exclusion in California’s 
workers’ compensation system.   
CONTRACTING AROUND 
In response to the flood of claims filed in California, several NFL 
teams have inserted choice of law and/or choice of forum clauses in 
the standard player contract requiring players to file their workers’ 
compensation claims in their home team’s state and under their home 
team’s law.29  Despite the contractual limitation, many former players 
pursued their claims in California, setting off a series of legal battles 
pitting the players versus their former teams and the contractual limi-
tations versus California’s statutory employee protections.  These bat-
tles have all proceeded on a similar trajectory:  1) teams have filed for 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See NFL Tackles Benefits, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997-
04-11/business/fi-47559_1_compensation-benefits.  
 28 See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 5. 
 29 For example, Paragraph 26D of Bruce Matthews’ contract with the Tennessee Titans 
provided as follows: 
Jurisdiction of all workers compensation claims and all other matters related to workers 
compensation, including but not limited to the matters recited in Paragraph 10 hereof, and 
including all issues of law, issues of fact, and matters related to workers compensation bene-
fits, shall be exclusively determined by and exclusively decided in accordance with the in-
ternal laws of the State of Tennessee without resort to choice of law rules.  
See Matthews v. Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). 
2012] Closing the Floodgates 113 
arbitration to prevent the players from seeking workers’ compensa-
tion benefits in California; 2) arbitrators have enforced the contrac-
tual limitations and ruled that the players may not seek benefits in 
California; 3) the teams have sought to confirm the awards (or the 
players have sought to overturn the award) in federal district court.30   
In each of the cases, arbitrators ruled that the choice of law/forum 
provisions were enforceable and that the players had therefore 
breached their contracts by filing workers’ compensation claims in 
California.  In other words, the arbitrators ruled that an employee’s 
workers’ compensation rights are waivable and that the players had 
waived their rights by agreeing to choice of law/forum provisions in 
their player contracts.31 
The battle then shifted to federal court, where the NFL Players 
Association (NFLPA) has argued that the choice of law/choice of fo-
rum provisions are illegal and unenforceable because, inter alia, they 
deprive the former players of their statutory rights to workers’ com-
pensation benefits in California and are thus contrary to public pol-
icy.32 The NFLPA argues that California law—like virtually every other 
state law—renders workers’ compensation benefits and protections 
unwaivable and declares void and unenforceable any contract at-
tempting to waive California workers’ compensation rights and pro-
tections.33  Without such protections for employees, the NFLPA con-
tends employers would simply require employees to waive their 
                                                                                                                           
 30 The seminal case involves NFL Hall of Famer Bruce Matthews and the Tennessee Titans.  
See Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671 
JLS WMC, 2011 WL 31068 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011). Other cases that have  involved former play-
ers include Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. v. Haynes, 816 F. Supp. 2d 534 (N.D. Ill. 2011), New 
Orleans Saints, LLC v. Cleeland, No. 2:11-cv-02093-KDE-ALC (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2011) (Beck, 
Arb.); Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. v. Allen, No. 4:12-cv-00238-BCW (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 
2012) (Beck, Arb.)., and Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC v. Nat’l Football League Players 
Ass’n, No. 1:12-cv-00753-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012) (Beck, Arb.).These cases are virtually 
identical but for the fact that Matthews only involved a choice of law clause while the other 
players had choice of law and choice of forum provisions in their contracts. 
 31 See Williams v. Jacksonville Jaguars, No. ADJ7672393 (Cal. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 
Aug. 9, 2012) (concluding that choice of law/forum provision in player contract required player 
to seek workers’ compensation claim in the chosen state instead of California); Carroll v. New 
Orleans Saints, No. ADJ2295331 (ANA0397551) (Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. Jan. 24, 2011). 
 32 Specifically, the players argue that the contractual limitation violates California public 
policy, federal law, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  This essay will focus on the public pol-
icy aspect of the issue. 
 33 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 5000 (2012) (“No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the 
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this division”); see also id. § 2804 (“Any 
contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this 
article or any part thereof, is null and void, and this article shall not deprive any employee or his 
personal representative of any right or remedy to which he is entitled under the laws of this 
State”). 
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workers’ compensation rights thus nullifying the important protec-
tions provided by the workers’ compensation regime.  
Courts have recognized the supremacy of California workers’ 
compensation rights in the past.  The key precedent in the area is 
Alaska Packers’ Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of Cali-
fornia, a case that worked its way through the California34 and United 
States35 Supreme Courts.36  In Alaska Packers’, an employment agree-
ment contained a choice of law provision which provided that work-
ers’ compensation disputes would be handled under Alaska law.37  De-
spite this provision, the employee applied for workers’ compensation 
benefits under California law.38  The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the choice of law clause was void under California law,39 
holding that a “contract attempting to avoid the liability imposed by 
the California [workers’ compensation] Act is invalid.”40  The United 
States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion holding that Cali-
fornia had a legitimate state interest in protecting the rights of its em-
ployees and did not exceed its power by precluding the waiver of 
workers’ compensation rights to achieve that end.41  As Professor Lar-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 34 P.2d 716 (1934).  See also 22 
Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 205 (Dec. 4, 1953) (“In the case of an attempted waiver of workmen's com-
pensation benefits, any such agreement is not only obviously against public policy, but is specifi-
cally prohibited by statute.  It might be noted in passing that in private employment any agree-
ments to waive employees’ rights against their employer for injury or death, etc., are void, as 
against public policy.”). 
 35 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
 36 The NFLPA also relies on Bowen v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board., where the 
court held that a contract clause attempting to defeat an employee’s claim for workers’ compen-
sation “would violate section 5000 prohibiting contracts exempting employers from liability 
under California Workers’ Compensation Act.”  73 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 15, 26-27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999).  See also Booker v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., No. ANA0401410, slip op. at 16 (Cal. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 2009) (“Any provision of the employment agreement between Mr. 
Booker and the Bengals which purports to limit the applicant’s ability to pursue workers’ com-
pensation benefits in the state of California is void and unenforceable.”). 
 37 See Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 538 (1935). 
 38 Id. at 538-39. 
 39 Under the predecessor statute to California Labor Code Section 5000. 
 40 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 34 P.2d at 721. 
 41 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 294 U.S. 532.  Other courts have similarly concluded that NFL 
players cannot contractually waive their rights to seek workers’ compensation benefits in those 
states.  See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 685 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“[T]he very 
purpose of [the anti-waiver provision in the workers’ compensation statute] is to ensure that 
employers cannot contract out of coverage.”); Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Newson, 783 F. Supp. 2d 
769, 773-74 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (discussing the workers’ compensation claim that rejected the Dol-
phins’ attempt to contractually limit former players’ ability to seek workers’ compensation bene-
fits in Pennsylvania); Bowen v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 73 Cal.App.4th 15, 26-27 (1999) 
(prohibiting waiver of California’s workers’ compensation benefits where contract was formed in 
California and employee was resident of California); Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Pro-
Football, 857 F. Supp. 71, 76-77, 80 (D.D.C. 1994) (vacating a NFL arbitration award because it 
violated a state’s public policy as codified by state statute).  See also P.I. & I. Motor Express, Inc. 
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son has explained, the rationale for preventing the contractual waiver 
of workers’ compensation rights is that such “compensation is not a 
private matter to be arranged between two parties; the public has a 
profound interest in the matter which cannot be altered by any 
agreements.”42   
Despite the holding in Alaska Packers’, all of the players’ at-
tempts to date to override the contractual limitations in their con-
tracts have been rebuffed.43  The basic rationale for choosing the con-
tractual limitation over the statutory workers’ compensation rights 
has been consistent in all of the cases—the players simply did not 
have sufficient contacts with California to fall clearly within the ambit 
of California’s workers’ compensation regime.  That is, with limited 
exception,44 none of the players alleged that they actually sustained 
any particular injury while playing in California, and none of the play-
ers signed their contracts in California or played a significant number 
of games in California.  Rather, the players signed their contracts in 
their teams’ home states, played the significant majority of their games 
(and practices) outside of California, and only alleged that they had 
suffered cumulative injuries either at “various locations,” “various lo-
cations and practice facilities,” or “various cities and states.”45  
A key point in analyzing these cases is to recognize that the 
courts were not permitted to review the arbitrators’ decisions de novo.  
Rather, the courts could only vacate the arbitration awards on public 
policy grounds if “an explicit, well defined and dominant public policy 
exists . . . and the policy is one that specifically militates against the 
relief ordered by the arbitrator,”46  and such “public policy must be 
                                                                                                                           
v. Indus. Comm’n, 857 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[A]ny agreement between an em-
ployer and an employee which purports to divest the Commission of jurisdiction where it other-
wise exists is contrary to the public policy of this State and is, therefore, unenforceable.”); 
Swenson v. Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 2011); Gotkin v. Weinberg, 66 A.2d 438, 439 
(N.J. 1949); McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 
2002); Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243, 244 (W. Va. 1981). 
 42 9 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 143.07 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2010). 
 43 See infra note 45. 
 44 One former player for the Atlanta Falcons did allege that he suffered an injury in Cali-
fornia. See Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, No. 1:12-
cv-00753-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2012) (Beck, Arb.). 
 45 See Matthews v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 
2012); New Orleans Saints, LLC v. Cleeland, No. 2:11-cv-02093-KDE-ALC (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 
2011) (Beck, Arb.); Atlanta Falcons Football Club LLC v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 1:12-cv-00753-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb.23, 2012) (Beck, Arb.). 
 46 United Food & Commercial Workers’ Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 
F.3d 169, 174 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See Foster Poultry Farms, 74 
F.3d at 173 (“[B]ecause federal labor policy strongly favors the resolution of labor disputes 
through arbitration, [j]udicial scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.”) (internal 
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ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not 
from general considerations of supposed public interests.”47  
The heavy burden of overturning an arbitration decision on pub-
lic policy grounds helped doom the players’ cases.  Matthews, the only 
case to produce a federal appellate decision to date, is instructive.  In 
Matthews, the district court rejected the notion that California law 
provides “an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy barring 
all contractual waivers of California workers’ compensation.”48 In-
stead, the court announced a “nuanced analysis in which courts con-
sidered the extent of California’s interest in providing workers’ com-
pensation.”49  Thus, the attempt to contractually foreclose the em-
ployee from workers’ compensation benefits in Alaska Packers’ was 
not automatically rendered contra public policy and void as a matter 
of law.  Rather, the limiting contractual provision was held void and 
unenforceable as against public policy only after a factual determina-
tion by the court that California had a sufficiently weighty interest in 
providing workers’ compensation in that particular instance.  Specifi-
cally, the court noted that California had a legitimate and tangible 
public policy interest in providing workers’ compensation benefits to 
the employee in Alaska Packers’ because the employment contract at 
issue was created in California.50  
In Matthews, no such interest existed because Matthews did not 
sign his contract in California, played only a limited number of games51 
in California during his nineteen year career, did not allege that he 
sustained any particular injury in California or needed medical ser-
vices in California, or put any burden on the state’s resources, and 
                                                                                                                           
quotation marks omitted); Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1877, AFL 
CIO, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld so long as they 
represent a plausible interpretation of the contract.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48 Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, No. 
10CV1671 JLS WMC, 2011 WL 31068, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011).  
 49 Id. 
 50 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1935); 
Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 34 P.2d 716, 720 (1934) (noting Cali-
fornia’s legislative directive that the workers’ compensation statute “shall apply to injuries re-
ceived abroad where the contract of hire is made within the state”).  See also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. 
v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 75 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Cal. 1938) (concluding that an employee who 
lived in Massachusetts, signed an employment contract in Massachusetts, and worked primarily 
in Massachusetts, but was injured while temporarily working in California, could not recover 
California workers’ compensation benefits if Massachusetts’ interests in the matter were greater 
than California’s interests). 
 51 Interestingly, counsel for Matthews did not even allege in his complaint that he played 
any games in California.  Instead, the court took judicial notice of the fact that Matthews’ teams 
played thirteen games in California during his career. Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1113. 
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only asserted that he “suffered cumulative injuries . . . at various’ loca-
tions between 1983 and 2001.”52   
The lack of contacts with California, in conjunction with the nar-
row standard of review, was fatal to Matthews’ case.  After all, the 
court was not asked to determine whether Matthews’ situation pre-
sented California with a sufficiently weighty interest in providing 
workers’ compensation such that the choice of law clause would be 
voided as against public policy.  That is, the court was not asked to de-
termine if Matthews was eligible for workers’ compensation in Cali-
fornia.  Rather, because the court was reviewing an arbitration award, 
it was “charged with determining only whether there is an explicit, 
well-defined, dominant public policy militating against the arbitration 
award.”53  Given that California’s public policy in these cases is situa-
tion-specific (varying with the strength of California’s interest in the 
particular case), the district court held that there could not be a 
“dominant” or “blanket” public policy sufficient to overturn the arbi-
tration award.54  Because contractual provisions can override employ-
ees’ California workers’ compensation rights in some cases, the court 
was unwilling to recognize the existence of a dominant public policy 
favoring the award of benefits in cumulative injury cases worthy of 
overturning the Matthews arbitration.    
The Ninth Circuit affirmed using a slightly different analysis and 
essentially announced an “eligibility plus” standard.  Given Matthews’ 
lack of contacts with the state, the court concluded that it was not 
clear that he was entitled to benefits under California’s workers’ com-
pensation laws.55  According to the court, “[t]he facts underlying Mat-
thews’ claim are distinct enough from existing California cases that we 
cannot say whether the California courts would consider Matthews’ 
limited contacts with the state sufficient to justify the application of 
California law.”56  Matthews alleged that he was injured in California 
because all of the games he played during his career—some of which 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1113. Similarly, in Haynes, the district court noted that the Bears 
players’ contracts were signed and substantially performed in Illinois, the Bears are located in 
Illinois, the parties negotiated for exclusive Illinois choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions, 
none of the players alleged that they had sustained any particular injury in California, and the 
players had only played approximately three percent of their games in California.  Given the 
lack of contact with California, the court not only found that California had no “dominant” 
public policy that would override the choice of law/forum provisions, but also asked “why is 
California’s public policy relevant at all?”  Similar facts and conclusions doomed the players’ 
cases against the Falcons, Chiefs, and Saints. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. v. Haynes, 816 F. 
Supp. 2d 534, 538 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 53 Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1111, 1114-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 1113-14. 
 56 Id. at 1114. 
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took place in California—contributed to his cumulative injuries.57  Al-
though the court conceded, as a matter of fact, that all of Matthews’ 
games—including the ones in California—may have contributed to his 
cumulative trauma, “it is not clear that, as a matter of California law, 
this means he falls within the category of employees to whom Califor-
nia extends workers’ compensation coverage.”58  In other words, be-
cause of the limited precedent in the area, the Ninth Circuit could not 
determine with certainty that Matthews was entitled to workers’ com-
pensation benefits as a matter of law and thus could not conclude that 
the “arbitration award is contrary to a clear, well-defined and domi-
nant public policy of the state of California.”59  The court thus sug-
gested that a player facing an adverse arbitration award must not only 
allege that he is eligible for benefits under California’s regime, but 
that he is “eligible plus.”  That is, the player must allege facts that 
make it clear that he is covered under California’s policy.   
The Ninth Circuit made it clear, however, that it was not holding 
that employers could use choice of law/forum clauses to trump em-
ployees’ rights to seek California workers’ compensation benefits in 
all cases.60  Rather, the Ninth Circuit noted that an employee who can 
make a prima facie showing that his injury would be covered under 
California’s workers’ compensation regime may be able to show that a 
contractual provision prohibiting him from seeking benefits in Cali-
fornia61 violates public policy and is therefore unenforceable.62  Mat-
thews failed to make such a prima facie case because, according to the 
Ninth Circuit, he failed to allege that he suffered a specific injury in 
California or placed any burden on the state’s medical system and 
because it was not “clear that California would extend its workers’ 
compensation regime to cover the cumulative injuries” given Mat-
thews’ limited contact with the state.63   
Again, it is important to note that the Ninth Circuit was not de-
ciding in the first instance if Matthews was eligible under California 
law for workers’ compensation benefits for his cumulative injuries 
suffered (allegedly) in part while playing in California.  Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit held only that it needed a clearer showing of Matthews’ 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. (“To be precise, we do not hold that employers may use binding arbitration of choice 
of law clauses as a means to evade California law where it would otherwise apply.”). 
 61 Or, more specifically, an arbitration award upholding such a contractual provision. 
 62 Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1112, 1114. 
 63 Id. at 1115-16. 
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entitlement to California benefits because it was required to give 
great deference to the arbitration award denying Matthews’ benefits.64 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was thus a loss for Matthews but at 
least a partial victory for other players seeking benefits from Califor-
nia’s workers’ compensation system.  After all, the court’s decision 
seems to suggest that an employer can contract around an employee’s 
California workers’ compensation benefits only if it is not clear that 
the employee is otherwise entitled to California workers’ compensa-
tion benefits.65  In other words, the Titans were able to contractually 
preclude Matthews from seeking workers’ compensation benefits in 
California for his cumulative injuries because Matthews’ lack of con-
tacts with California raised at least some question about his eligibility 
for workers’ compensation benefits in California.66  More significantly, 
however, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion suggests such contractual waivers 
would be voided as contra public policy if the employee were clearly 
entitled to benefits in California.  Matthews would have been able to 
override the contractual waiver if he had been able to allege that he 
suffered an injury in California, placed a burden on California’s medi-
cal system, or had some other more significant contact with the state 
other than merely playing a fraction of his NFL games there.  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, was unwilling to vacate the arbitration award 
given the lack of clarity regarding Matthews’ eligibility for California 
benefits and thus the lack of clarity regarding the strength of Califor-
nia’s public policy interests.67   
This decision closed the door on Matthews but leaves the door 
open for players who can allege sufficient contacts with California to 
indicate that California has a “dominant” or “clear” public policy in 
ensuring such player receives workers’ compensation benefits in the 
state.  Where that line will be drawn is unclear, but Matthews provides 
a rough road map for players, and we can expect to see players filing 
complaints that more specifically tie their injuries to California where 
possible.  That line may also become clearer if California hands down 
more decisions indicating the strength or weakness of California’s 
public policy in granting benefits for cumulative trauma where no spe-
cific injury in California is alleged. 
For now, however, as both the district court and Ninth Circuit 
opinions suggest, it is not enough for players to show that they would 
otherwise have been eligible for benefits in California because of the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. at 1116-17. 
 66 Obviously, in cases where the employee is not entitled to benefits in California, a waiver 
of those benefits is unnecessary. 
 67 Matthews, 688 F.3d at 1116-17. 
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cumulative trauma they suffered while playing at least one game in 
California.  Rather, players must allege “eligibility plus” to show that 
California has a clear or dominant interest in providing benefits to 
them.  Without such a showing, the Ninth Circuit is unwilling to void a 
contractual provision restricting players from seeking benefits outside 
of their respective home teams’ states.   
Thus, while the NFL has won most of the early battles to carve 
away California’s broad jurisdiction through choice of law/forum pro-
visions, the fight will continue as courts struggle with California’s in-
terest in protecting players who may have suffered cumulative injuries 
while playing a limited number of games in the state.  The battle also 
continues over the interpretation of the reciprocity provision the Cali-
fornia system. 
RECIPROCITY 
While the teams and players will continue to battle over the effi-
cacy of the choice of law/forum provisions in players’ contracts, the 
“reciprocity measure” in California’s workers’ compensation regime 
has served as another avenue for teams to seek relief from claims in 
California.68  Although California’s workers’ compensation regime 
provides protection and benefits for all in-state injuries (including 
cumulative trauma), the reciprocity carve-out in Section 3600.5(b) 
provides a significant exception for the coverage.69  Under Section 
3600.5(b), an employer is exempt from California’s workers’ compen-
sation scheme if all of the following conditions are met: 
                                                                                                                           
 68 CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600.5(b) (2012).  The statute states as follows: 
(b) Any employee who has been hired outside of this state and his employer shall be ex-
empted from the provisions of this division while such employee is temporarily within this 
state doing work for his employer if such employer has furnished workmen’s compensation 
insurance coverage under the workmen’s compensation insurance or similar laws of a state 
other than California, so as to cover such employee’s employment while in this state; pro-
vided, the extraterritorial provisions of this division are recognized in such other state and 
provided employers and employees who are covered in this state are likewise exempted 
from the application of the workmen’s compensation insurance or similar laws of such 
other state.  The benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Insurance Act or similar laws 
of such other state, or other remedies under such act or such laws, shall be the exclusive 
remedy against such employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, received by 
such employee while working for such employer in this state. 
A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the appeals board or similar department of 
another state certifying that the employer of such other state is insured therein and has 
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working within this state 
shall be prima facie evidence that such employer carries such workmen's compensation in-
surance. 
Id.  
 69 Id.  
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1) The employer has provided workers’ compensation insurance 
of a similar nature in another state; 
2) California’s extra-territorial provisions are recognized in that 
other state; 
3) California’s employees are afforded a reciprocal exemption 
under the law of the other state; 
4) The employee was “temporarily” performing work within Cali-
fornia.70 
The challenge for teams seeking to gain an exemption via the re-
ciprocity measure is proving that the employee was “temporarily” 
working in California.  There is little precedent in this area, but the 
early decisions of the California Workers’ Compensation Board are 
split.  In Carroll, the Board held that Carroll’s relatively minimal time 
spent playing football in California was sufficient to constitute “regu-
lar” (and thus not temporary) employment for purposes of the recip-
rocity provision.71  The Board noted that “the Bengals are a part of the 
NFL and its games are scheduled in California in a deliberate and 
regular manner in the course of their business of playing professional 
football games.”72  The Board conceded that Carroll’s employment 
activity was “very minor, time-wise,” but concluded that the NFL’s 
decision to regularly schedule games in California was sufficient to 
render an NFL player who plays a single game in California as “regu-
larly employed” within the state.73  This classification thus eliminates a 
league’s ability to utilize the reciprocity provision to exempt their 
players from coverage under California’s workers’ compensation re-
gime.  
In Booker v. Cincinnati Bengals, the Board reached the opposite 
conclusion under a similar factual scenario.74  The Board found that 
Booker, who had played one game in California during his three sea-
sons with the Cincinnati Bengals, was not “regularly” employed in 
California and therefore found him to be a “temporary employee” for 
purposes of the reciprocity measure.75  The Board found that the other 
prongs of California Labor Code § 3500.5(b) were met and therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. Other states have similar reciprocity measures.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.54 
(2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.344 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-15 (2012); UTAH CODE. § 35-1-
55 (2012). 
 71 Carroll v. New Orleans Saints, No. ADJ2295331 (ANA0397551), at 11-14 (Workers' 
Comp. Appeals Bd. Jan. 24, 2011). 
 72 Id. at 14. 
 73 Id. at 13-14. 
 74 Booker v. Cincinnati Bengals, No. ANA 0401410, at 2, 10-11 (Cal. Workers’ Comp. App. 
Bd. Feb. 8, 2012). 
 75 Id.  
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concluded that Booker was required to pursue his workers’ compen-
sation claims in Ohio.76 
Both conclusions contain some merit.  To the extent that the fo-
cus is on the relative length of time spent in California, players from 
non-California teams may best be deemed “temporarily” employed in 
California.  To the extent that the focus is on the fact that all teams 
regularly play football in California, players from non-California 
teams may best be deemed “regularly” employed in California.  A full 
discussion of the merits of these arguments is well beyond the scope 
of this brief essay, but the reciprocity provision may turn out to be the 
best avenue for non-California teams to shut the door on California, 
particularly where the former players are able to allege a specific in-
jury in California.  
CONCLUSION 
While the massive multi-district concussion litigation between re-
tired NFL players and the NFL steals most of the headlines, the battle 
over workers’ compensation rights between former players and their 
NFL teams is quietly working its way through the courts.  Teams have 
had early success closing the door on California workers’ compensa-
tion benefits through the use of choice of law/forum clauses, but the 
recent Matthews decision paints a road map for former players—or 
the state of California—to pry the door back open. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. at 6, 10. 
